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CHECK ONE AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY IS DONE: THE 
HARMFUL IMPACT OF STRAIGHT-TICKET VOTING ON 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
Meryl Chertoff* & Dustin F. Robinson** 
INTRODUCTION 
States that elect judges are heir to a populist tradition dating 
back to the Jacksonian era.  In the spectrum between independence 
and accountability, these states emphasize accountability.  Systems 
vary from state to state, and even within states there may be 
geographic diversity or different selection systems for different 
levels of courts.  Elections can be partisan or non-partisan, 
contested, or, as in merit-selection states, retention.  Some states 
have dabbled in public financing of judicial elections.  Reformers are 
most critical of contested partisan elections.  Those are the elections 
where the most money is spent, the nastiest ads aired, and the 
dignity of the judicial office most often impugned.  One factor that 
often goes unnoticed, perhaps because of its unquestioned status in 
a partisan election, is the ballot itself. 
Critics of partisan judicial elections decry the very concept of 
attaching a party label to a judicial candidate.1  The argument 
certainly has its merits.  However, even if a voter blindly checks the 
box for every Democrat (for example) on the ballot, at least he has to 
confront the name and notice that the candidate is running for a 
judgeship.  Some sort of internal evaluation—perhaps memory 
recall of campaign literature or radio advertisements—remotely 
 
* Meryl Chertoff is Director, The Justice and Society Program, The Aspen Institute, and 
Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. 
** Dustin F. Robinson is a graduate of Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2012.  
This paper grows out of work done in a 2010 seminar on state court judicial selection.  
Thanks to Bert Brandenburg of Justice at Stake, Professor Chertoff‘s co-instructor for that 
course; to Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor for inspiring the decision to teach the seminar; and to 
the Justice and Society Program and the Aspen Institute for supporting the preparation of 
this article.  Special thanks to Michael Green, Justice and Society Program Manager, and 
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1 See, e.g., Editorial, Firing Judges, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2010, at A20, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/04/AR2010110407646.html. 
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informs the choice.  Nevertheless, in a few states, the voter need not 
even do that; he literally need only check a single box and be out of 
the voting booth in thirty seconds or less.  Straight-ticket voting2 
virtually nullifies the legitimacy of judicial selection in partisan 
election states.  The low informational nature of these races makes 
straight-ticket voting attractive to the uninformed voter.  Parties in 
states that allow the practice seize the opportunity to take 
advantage of the uninformed voter and urge the single checkmark. 
If the logic of an elected judiciary is that it is more accountable to 
the public it serves, then straight-ticket voting directly contravenes 
that goal by placing all the power in the selection process in the 
hands of party leaders.  Not only are minority party candidates 
handicapped in such a system, so are majority party candidates who 
fail to win the favor of party leadership.  Judicial candidates and 
judges are indebted to leadership for their patronage and 
nomination, despite the fact that the judiciary does not align with 
conventional party platforms.  Ultimately, uninformed voting 
translates to facile voting, and influence translates to control.  The 
judges who win in straight ticket races are likely neither 
accountable to the people nor independent of the party that elevated 
them. 
At present, sixteen states‘ ballots have a straight ticket option.3  
Of those, three select their judges through partisan elections and 
require that their judges participate in regular general elections, 
not retention elections: Alabama, Texas, and West Virginia.4  As 
such, these three are the states in which voters are most likely to 
rely on straight-party voting in casting their votes in judicial 
elections. 
Texas stands as a prime example of a state where politics, and 
particularly straight-ticket voting, has long had a visible influence 
in the election of judges.  As the current Chief Justice, Wallace 
Jefferson, observed in connection with his own election: 
My success depended primarily on a straight-ticket partisan 
vote. . . . Even if I had never appeared in court, lost every 
endorsement and fared poorly in polls that assess 
 
2 Straight-ticket voting is understood here as literally the single party box check rather 
than checking every member of a given party on the ballot, which is downright deliberative in 
comparison. 
3 Straight-Ticket Voting, NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org 
/default.aspx?tabid=16597 (last updated June 2, 2011). 
4 Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE SOC‘Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/ 
judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= (last visited June 9, 2012). 
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qualifications, I would still have won in Texas.  The state 
voted for McCain, and I was the down-ballot beneficiary.  
Currently, merit matters little in judicial elections.  We close 
our eyes and vote for judges based on party affiliation even 
though a party label does not ensure a judiciary committed 
to the rule of law.5 
Former Chief Justice, Tom Phillips, echoed the point: 
Most of us [judges] feel like judges should not run as 
Republicans or Democrats, which . . . in my opinion has been 
a terrible blow for the stability of our judiciary.  As the state 
has changed from one party to the other over the last decade, 
over 200 of our state trial and appellate judges have been 
defeated in general elections.  In almost every case for no 
other reason that I can identify other than they were 
running on the party that was not popular.6 
While no case has reached the U.S. Supreme Court questioning 
Texas‘ straight-ticket voting system for its judges, it may not be an 
accident that the high court‘s two most recent relevant cases 
involved West Virginia, which has a straight-ticket option on its 
ballot, and New York, where although there is no straight-ticket 
option, voter behavior is typically lock-step in voting straight party 
line (downstate, Democratic, and upstate, Republican). 
In the pages that follow, we examine straight-ticket voting, the 
particularly pernicious role it plays with respect to voter choice, and 
its impact on both judicial independence and accountability.  We 
then consider the probable outcome of a constitutional challenge to 
Texas straight-ticket voting—we think it would likely fail—and 
suggest two partial ways out of the thicket, one legislative and one 
administrative. 
I.  THE EFFECT OF STRAIGHT-TICKET VOTING ON INDEPENDENCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Independence and accountability are the central competing ideals 
in judicial selection; both qualities are fundamental to a judiciary‘s 
legitimacy.  A state‘s decision to elect its judiciary necessarily 
 
5 Wallace B. Jefferson, Op-Ed., Making Merit Matter By Adopting New System of Selecting 
Judges (Mar. 21, 2009), HOUS. CHRONICLE, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/ 
article/Wallace-B-Jefferson-Make-merit-matter-by-1544078.php. 
6 Interview with Tom Phillips, WMHT: JUSTICE FOR SALE (2009), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/justice/interviews/phillips.html (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2012). 
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prioritizes accountability above independence, but some semblance 
of the latter must remain for the sake of judicial integrity.  The 
electoral context, particularly the partisan variety, automatically 
ushers in politics.  The influence and financial strength of the major 
parties and complementary interest groups have irrevocably shaped 
the tone and substance of judicial elections around the country.  The 
dominance of parties is exaggerated in states where straight ticket 
voting is an option, and judicial independence suffers.  Additionally, 
and contrary to the intent of judicial elections, straight-ticket voting 
renders meaningful judicial accountability highly unlikely. 
A.  Party Influence and Judicial Independence 
Political parties and partisan interests have moved steadily into 
the judicial election field as judicial independence gradually erodes.  
There is evidence to suggest that parties are overtly nationalizing 
state-level judicial elections.  Though still in a nascent stage, the 
Democratic Judicial Campaign Committee, formed in 2007, has an 
explicitly partisan goal: elect Democratic judges to state courts.7  No 
corresponding Republican effort currently exists, but this may be 
due to the lack of a need for one, given the funding ability and 
staunchly Republican allegiances of the various chambers of 
commerce throughout the country (the U.S. Chamber and its Ohio 
affiliates spent $4.4 million in 2000, while the U.S. Chamber and 
the Illinois Republican Party teamed up to spend $1.9 million in 
2004).8 
To be sure, political parties are very interested in state judicial 
elections.  The ramifications of the deep pockets of parties are 
largest in states where partisan elections occur.  From 2000 to 2009, 
the Alabama Democratic Party spent just under $5.5 million on 
judicial elections.9  The Illinois Democratic and Republican parties 
were the top spenders in their state over the past decade ($3.7 and 
$1.9 million, respectively).10  The Texas Democratic Party spent just 
over $900,000 on television advertisements for the 2008 state 
supreme court elections alone (though all three races were lost).11  
Money equals power and, more often than not, money equals votes.  
 
7 JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009: DECADE OF 
CHANGE 44–45 (2010). 
8 Id. at 10. 
9 Id. at 78. 
10 Id. at 79. 
11 Id. at 83. 
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In judicial elections where a majority of the populace may not even 
be aware the race exists, an expensive primetime television or other 
media buy in a major market may make all the difference, and he or 
she with the wealthier friends, or party bosses, can afford it. 
With that power comes a chilling effect; whether or not their 
actual decision-making is affected in individual cases, the specter 
lingers in the popular imagination that judges decide cases the way 
their political patrons want them decided, at the peril of their jobs.  
This is the antithesis of judicial independence.  While polling shows 
that the threat to the integrity and impartiality of legal opinions 
strikes a large number of Americans as repugnant and anathema to 
the rule of law,12 voters in elected judge states are fairly likely to 
hold their noses, especially in states where straight-ticket voting is 
available.  Party allegiance and convenience trump concerns over 
judicial independence.13  Partisan dominance of every aspect of the 
judicial selection process in those states with straight-ticket 
voting14—from the hand picking of candidates to the dissemination 
of propaganda—corrupts the idea of an independent judiciary, one 
distinct from the chaos of partisan politics.  The threat that 
straight-ticket voting poses to institutional independence is both 
particularly strong and insidious, as the judiciary becomes just 
another partisan branch of government. 
B.  Party Influence and Judicial Accountability 
At the opposite end of the spectrum of judicial values, 
accountability was supposedly the impetus for judicial elections in 
 
12 For example, seventy-eight percent of Minnesotans ―are ‗very‘ or ‗somewhat‘ concerned 
that judicial candidates must raise more money, run television advertising, and potentially 
seek party and political interest group support.‖ Poll of Minnesota Citizens, JUSTICE AT STAKE 
CAMPAIGN, http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources/polls.cfm (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
13 In contrast to Minnesota, polls have shown seventy percent of Texans favoring judicial 
elections. Anthony Champagne & Kyle Cheek, The Cycle of Judicial Elections: Texas as a 
Case Study, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907, 935 n. 136 (2002).  However, at one point, eighty-
three percent believed the elections should be nonpartisan.  Janet Elliott, Ethics Rules 
Revised for Candidates, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Oct. 23, 2002, at A34, available at 
http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Wallace-B-Jefferson-Make-merit-matter-by-
1544078.php.  This tolerance for judicial elections may be a quirk unique to the United States 
populace.  While a few judicial elections do take place in Swiss cantons and some Japanese 
judges stand for retention elections, the United States is unique in subjecting a significant 
percentage of its judiciary to the electoral process. 
14 It should be acknowledged that partisan dominance of judicial selection may not be 
endemic to partisan election states; in those states where governors appoint judges to terms, 
certainly party alliance between the judge and the executive could factor into the equation.  
However, the politics are nowhere near as rampant and threatening to judicial independence 
as they are in straight-ticket voting states. 
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the first place.15  Yet straight-ticket voting wreaks havoc on judicial 
independence, without concomitant gains in accountability. 
Accountability is viable in a judicial selection system.  While 
merit selection states tend to give a nod to incumbents, recent years 
have seen a number of instances in which state high court judges 
lost their seats in retention elections and contested elections due to 
one highly unpopular decision.  For a recent and dramatic example 
of drastic voter enforcement of judicial accountability, look to the 
2010 Iowa Supreme Court retention election, where three state 
supreme court justices lost their seat due to the unpopularity of a 
single decision on same-sex marriage.16  While Iowa employs a 
merit selection/retention system, not a partisan election system, 
this example demonstrates the power that a coalition of well-funded 
individuals can wield.  In effect, such a coalition can buy an 
election.  The anti-retention forces in this race raised approximately 
$650,000 to remove three justices who were part of a unanimous 
decision finding that the Iowa constitution required the recognition 
of gay marriage.  Previously, no justice had failed a retention 
election since the adoption of the merit selection system in 1962.  In 
the same year, a move to defeat Kansas Supreme Court justices who 
had voted for an unpopular decision was narrowly beaten back, and 
there have been similar episodes in Pennsylvania and Colorado.  
Practices such as these raise their own set of problems—ones well 
beyond the scope of this article.  More edifying practices to increase 
accountability include the incorporation of judicial performance 
evaluations (―JPEs‖) to inform voters on whether to vote for or 
against a sitting judge‘s retention. 
Colorado‘s JPE program considers such criteria as courtroom 
demeanor, efficiency on the bench, and rigorousness of appellate 
decisions.17  As Rebecca Kourlis, a former chief justice of the 
Colorado Supreme Court notes, the program has proven both 
popular and effective.  A television advertisement recently ran 
encouraging voters to visit the evaluation committee‘s website, 
where a voter could easily access information on a given judge.18  
 
15 Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters For 
Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1259–60 (2008). 
16 Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REGISTER.COM, (Nov. 3, 
2010), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismis 
s-three-justices. 
17 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 8, 11, 13–15 (2006). 
18 Judicial Performance Reviews, COLO. OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, 
http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/review.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
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Colorado judges are held accountable for their performance on the 
bench through these informed evaluations; the electorate can 
remove a judge for failure to abide by standards laid out by the 
evaluation committee and reported on by those with firsthand 
experience with the judge (litigants, courtroom staff, etc.).19  This 
makes sense for a state that opts to prioritize accountability.  Those 
passing judgment on the judge, the voters, have the ability to 
inform themselves as to whether a judge is good at his or her job. 
Texas, Alabama, and West Virginia do not utilize an evaluation 
system like Colorado‘s.20  There is little in the way of monitoring or 
oversight of judicial performance at all.  In Texas, in fact, political 
party leadership urges the opposite of accountability during election 
season.  The Dallas County Democratic Party chairwoman urged 
voters in the 2008 election to: ―vote D and you‘re done.‖21  A state 
senator similarly informed voters: ―[o]ne and you‘re done.‖22  County 
party chairpersons routinely rally the electorate around the idea of 
casting only one vote.23 
Party dominance of judicial elections in Texas remains strong.  A 
2008 Texas Democratic Party advertisement focused on the solely 
Republican membership of the state‘s supreme court and 
emphasized its perceived propensity to overturn jury rulings in 
favor of big business and insurance interests.24  The ad concluded 
 
19 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 17, at 8, 11, 16–18. 
20 See Methods of Judicial Selection Retention: Evaluation Programs, AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC‘Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/judicial_performance_evalu 
ations.cfm?state (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (explaining that Texas, Alabama, and West 
Virginia do not evaluate the performance of judges who are up for reelection while Colorado 
has legislation which calls for midterm and retention year evaluations by the office of judicial 
performance evaluation that specifies evaluation criteria).  Aside from decentralized efforts, 
such as those of the Dallas Bar Association, see Judicial Evaluation Poll, DALL. BAR ASS‘N, 
http://www.dallasbar.org/general-election-polls (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (offering judicial 
evaluations of judicial evaluations during non-election years), or the League of Women Voters 
of Alabama, see Alabama Elections, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ALABAMA, 
http://www.lwval.org/learn-vote/election2012/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (providing election 
information for voters of the primary elections), neither the judiciaries nor the state bar 
associations of these states provide formalized evaluations of judges.  Would a voter faced 
with the Harris County (Houston, Texas) ballot opt to become educated on every one of the 
seventy or so judges‘ evaluations?  A later discussion of voter fatigue should indicate the 
unlikelihood of such informed democracy when all one has to do, instead, is pick ―R‖ or ―D.‖ 
21 Gromer Jeffers, Jr., Parties Beg: Vote Straight Ticket North Texas Candidates’ Fates 
Ride on Support of Base at Polls, DALL. MORN. NEWS, Oct. 22, 2008, at 2B. 
22 Id. 
23 Ironically, the mechanics of straight ticket voting have been abused for the sake of vote 
invalidation: in 2008, there were rumors that Republican interests were subversively 
encouraging voters to just check the Democratic box, but to be sure to check the box for 
Barack Obama as well.  See id.  A Texas ballot is invalidated if a voter checks the straight 
party option and then marks anything further. 
24 MSHCINTERACTIVE, Fair and Balanced Supreme Court, YOUTUBE (Oct. 24, 2008), 
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with a voiceover calling for ―fair and balanced courts‖ and then 
listed the names of the three candidates.  The visual text of the ad 
read, ―Vote for Democrats.‖25  Though not explicitly condoned in the 
advertisement, the implication was to vote a straight ticket.  This 
goal was made markedly easier by the ability of Texas voters to do 
so with a single checkmark. 
The straight party option, at least in Texas, has resulted in 
county-wide sweeps, or flips, of lower court judges, with the flips 
corresponding to the partisan mood of the general population.  The 
2010 judicial elections in Harris County (which encompasses 
Houston) resulted in a ―straight ticket bonanza‖ for the Republican 
party.  The county‘s party chairman, citing the likely 70 judge 
pickup for the party (a complete victory), called it ―fabulous.‖26 
His Democratic counterpart lamented that though ―[the 
Democrats] had a good slate of judges . . . . [t]hey got caught up in 
the fact that there are so many judicial positions on the ballot that 
it‘s virtually impossible for the average voter to know which ones 
are deserving of support and which ones aren‘t.‖27  That chairman 
likely was not saying the same thing in years prior: similar flips 
happened in Harris County in 2008 and Dallas County in 2006, but 
both in favor of Democrats.28  As Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson of 
the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged, in Texas‘ electoral climate, 
as long as the straight ticket option persists, Democratic judicial 
candidates do not have realistic access to statewide positions and 
Republicans are at a disadvantage in urban, lower court races 
(though 2010‘s anti-Democratic mood apparently assuaged the 
latter).29 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZK0ubaqo5RA&feature=player_embedded (citing David A. 
Anderson, Judicial Tort Reform in Texas, 26 REV. LITIG. 1, 7–22 (2007)). 
25 MSHCINTERACTIVE, supra note 24. 
26 Brian Rogers, Straight-Ticket Vote Rules in Judicial Races, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Nov. 2, 
2010), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7276263.html. 
27 Id. 
28 Such judicial flips not only represent the domination of party politics, but also the 
sweeping out of experienced trial judges to make room for an incoming class made up largely 
of judicial freshmen.  The implications for the efficiency, authority, and integrity of the bench 
are daunting.  See generally Mike Tolson, Democratic Sweep Revives Debate on Election of 
Judges, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Nov. 9, 2008), http://www.chron.com/default/article/Democratic-
sweep-revives-debate-on-election-of-1780514.php (discussing the Democratic flip in Harris 
County where twenty-two of twenty-six Republican judicial incumbents lost their seats and 
the learning curve faced by newly elected judges); Thomas Korosec, Democrats Turn Dallas 
County a Shade of Blue, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.chron.com/ 
default/article/Democrats-turn-Dallas-County-a-shade-of-blue-1887588.php (reporting that 
straight ticket voting resulted in the Democratic Party gaining forty-two judgeships, the 
district attorney‘s office, and the county judge‘s seat). 
29 See Wallace Jefferson, The State of the Judiciary in Texas, 72 TEX. BAR J. 287, 289 
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From a judicial administration perspective, too, sweeps are a 
disaster.  They purge the bench of experienced judges and require 
the courts to play catch-up in many respects as the new judges 
acclimate to their roles. 
Party ideology and factors generally recognized as making for a 
―good‖ judge do not neatly align.  Whether a judge or judicial 
candidate is a Republican or Democrat does not speak to his or her 
ability to manage a substantial trial docket, to exercise decorum on 
the bench, or to author intelligent, reasoned opinions.  Straight 
ticket voting substitutes party identification for considered 
evaluation and thus fails to serve accountability interests. 
II.  STRAIGHT TICKET VOTING: AN ARTIFICIAL CURE TO ROLL-OFF 
SYNDROME 
Ballot format has been consistently understood to impact voter 
response and election results.  To advocates of straight-ticket 
voting, the greatest balloting evil is down-ballot ―roll-off.‖  ―Down 
ballot‖ races, those races lower on the ballot and less salient to the 
public, are particularly likely to suffer from a voter ―roll off‖ effect: a 
voter will reach these races on the ballot, determine he or she does 
not have the information necessary to make an informed decision, 
and opt not to cast a vote.30  If a voter casts a vote in such races, it is 
possible he or she may do so based on such arbitrary criteria as 
gender or perceived ethnicity.31  Judicial races are particularly 
likely to suffer from the two hallmarks of a down ballot race: a 
spatial and an informational handicap. 
A.  Judicial Ballot Layout 
The very spatial organization of a typical ballot ensures that 
judicial races will receive fewer votes.  Ballot position research has 
determined that races found lower on the ballot are more 
susceptible to roll off as a function of voter fatigue, as voters grow 
 
(2009) (suggesting a merit system for choosing judges to remedy the problems of both 
Democrats and Republicans). 
30 See David Brockington, A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect, 25 POL. 
BEHAV. 1, 2 (2003); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Mobilizing Interest: The Effects 
of Money on Citizen Participation in State Supreme Court Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 457, 
459 (2008).  Voter roll-off can top fifty percent depending on the state.  Hall & Bonneau, 
supra, at 459.  Hall and Bonneau‘s paper notes the interaction between voter roll off and the 
amount of money spent on a particular campaign.  Id. 
31 See Brockington, supra note 30, at 4. 
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tired with checking off boxes or pulling levers.32  In those states 
where judicial elections are conducted concordantly with the other 
standard November elections, judgeships are relegated to a position 
further down the ballot than national and other statewide offices, 
such as governor, as well as offices ranging from comptroller to 
railroad commissioner.33 
Beyond that, the number of judicial elections on a given ballot 
may be overwhelming.  The 2010 ballot in Birmingham, Alabama 
(Jefferson County) included twenty-four judicial races.34  The 2010 
ballot in Houston, Texas (Harris County) included seventy-two 
judicial races (ranging from state supreme court justices to county 
probate judges).35  As Richard Murray, a political scientist at the 
University of Houston noted, Harris County may have the longest 
ballot in the entire country.36  Birmingham voters, let alone 
Houston voters, face a daunting task when entering the voting 
booth and the likelihood of voter fatigue increases proportionately. 
B.  Judicial Election Information 
The notoriously low informational nature of judicial elections 
represents the second hallmark of a down ballot race.  Roll off is 
more likely to occur when the ballot does not contain informational 
cues.37 
More often than not, voters know little, if anything, about a slate 
of judicial candidates.  A poll conducted in 2001 showed that 
seventy-three percent of respondents had only some or a little 
information about judicial candidates, while fourteen percent had 
no information at all.38  If a judicial race attracts attention, that 
attention is often solely a function of the tendency of the news 
 
32 See id. at 2–3. 
33 See Election 2010: Harris County Sample Ballot, CHRON.COM, 
http://blogs.chron.com/election/2010/11/harris_county_sample_ballot.html (last visited Apr. 
23, 2012) [hereinafter Harris County Sample Ballot] (featuring a sample ballot from the 
General and Special Elections of Harris County on Nov. 2, 2010). 
34 ALABAMAVOTES.GOV., http://alabamavotes.gov/downloads/election/2010/general/sample 
ballots/Jefferson-2010-Sample.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Jefferson County 
Sample Ballot]. 
35 See Harris County Sample Ballot, supra note 33. 
36 See Alan Bernstein, Many Harris Voters Cut Long Ballot by Picking Straight Ticket, 
HOUS. CHRONICLE (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/ 
6073645.html. 
37 See Brockington, supra note 30, at 3–4. 
38 Geyh, supra note 15, at 1270 (citing Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research Inc., JUSTICE 
AT STAKE FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 4 (2001) available at, 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyResults_6F537F99272D4.pdf). 
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media to create a ―horse race‖ narrative in partisan elections.39 
Voters are thus left with little substantive information about the 
judicial context.  It is not unusual for a judicial campaign to receive 
no more than two news stories in a newspaper covering the 
election.40  Beyond the sheer dearth of information, judicial elections 
are more difficult for the electorate to comprehend on a conceptual 
level. The special nature of a judicial election offers few 
opportunities to provide informational shortcuts or galvanizing 
messages tailored to the judicial context: ―Vote for Stare Decisis!‖ 
does not make for good campaign paraphernalia.41 
Voters attuned to judicial races are not likely to encounter 
deliberative educational conversations about a race.42  The 
substance of judicial elections, which theoretically should be 
grounded in abstract legal considerations such as constitutional 
philosophy and appellate practice, renders them more esoteric, 
lacking a natural partisan foothold.  While there are some readily 
available partisan sound bites extolling or decrying originalism or 
judicial activism,43 the number of talking points pales in comparison 
to that for legislative and executive elections (where the content 
may range from taxation to abortion, issues highly salient to 
voters).44 
C.  The Straight Ticket “Cure” 
Straight ticket voting provides a palliative for roll off, as indicated 
 
39 David B. Rottman, Conduct and its Oversight in Judicial Elections: Can Friendly 
Persuasion Outperform the Power to Regulate?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1295, 1314 (2008) 
(citing BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER & JENNIFER SEGAL DIASCRO, Judicial Elections in the News, in 
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 115, 121–24 (Mathew J. Streb ed. 2007) (assessing the number of articles covering 
judicial elections and finding that in the period from 2000–2004, in states with contestable 
judicial elections, on average, supreme court races attracted less than ten news articles, a 
fourth of which were editorials and that most stories were not printed in the first section of 
the newspaper)). 
40 Id. at 1314 n.63. 
41 David Pozen, Are Judicial Elections Democracy-Enhancing?, in WHAT‘S LAW GOT TO DO 
WITH IT?  WHAT JUDGES DO AND WHY IT MATTERS, 17 (Charles G. Geyh, ed., 2011). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 17–18. 
44 But see Gay Marriage, Tax Fights Spark High-Profile Court Races,Justice at Stake & 
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releases.cfm/ 
gay_marriage_tax_fights_spark_highprofile_court_races?show=news&newsID=8857.  
Colorado, Iowa, and Kansas experienced highly publicized judicial races in 2010, all in mere 
retention elections (the three states employ the merit selection system), motivated, 
respectively, by taxation issues, gay marriage, and abortion.  The appropriateness of the 
prominence of these issues in judicial selection is highly questionable. 
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in much of the political science literature on the topic.45  Voters get 
not only the informational cue of party affiliation, but also the ease 
of checking a single box and being done.  As Murray acknowledged, 
straight ticket voting is ―certainly a time saver, if you‘re looking for 
efficiency.‖46  Party cues typically provide a strong heuristic for 
voters.47  In informational theory terms, party cues are considered 
secondary information (information that can be gathered from a 
cursory glance at the ballot); primary information refers to 
information garnered from actual campaign or issue research.48  
Party identification is widely understood to be one of the strongest 
sources of political association, the method by which voters identify 
themselves in the electoral context.49  Consequently, partisan races 
in which candidates are identified as a Democrat or Republican (or, 
hypothetically, Libertarian, Green, or any other party affiliation) 
are less likely to suffer from diminished voter response. 
The availability of straight ticket voting increases the total 
number of ballots cast for all races in a given election.  Down ballot 
races, in particular, are more likely to receive a vote in states that 
allow for straight ticket voting.50  In fact, two thirds of voters in 
Harris County utilized the straight ticket function on their ballots 
in the 2004 election, amounting to approximately seven hundred 
thousand voters.51 By definition, those were seven hundred 
thousand voters who effectively cast a vote in every judicial race in 
the county. 
On some level, this could be considered a boon for judicial 
elections: participation grows exponentially and elections of judges 
are seemingly legitimized.  But how legitimate is a vote based upon 
minimal information and reasoning?  A general presumption exists 
that, in states where judges are elected, accountability factors 
heavily into judicial selection, but independence is not to be entirely 
 
45 Brockington, supra note 30, at 2–3; Philip Dubois, Voter Turnout in State Judicial 
Elections: An Analysis of the Tail on the Electoral Kite, 41 J. OF POLITICS 865, 876–83 (1979).  
Dubois emphasizes the impact of the Indiana or ―party column‖ ballot, used by the states that 
allow for straight ticket voting, and its tendency to drastically decrease voter roll off as 
compared to states with other forms of partisan ballots and states with nonpartisan or 
retention elections. 
46 Bernstein, supra note 36. 
47 Brockington, supra note 30, at 4. 
48 Id. 
49 See generally JAMES STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: HOW PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2004); BENJAMIN PAGE & ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY 
YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS‘ PUBLIC POLICY PREFERENCES (1992). 
50 Brockington, supra note 30, at 5 n.10. 
51 Bernstein, supra note 36. 
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eschewed.  Can independence exist if judges in straight party ticket 
states are essentially indebted to the political parties for their 
ascension to and persistence on the bench?  Is there true 
accountability when a voter does not even recognize the judge for 
whom he or she votes? 
Coordinated county campaigns, whatever salutary effect they 
may have on the political branches, provide no information on the 
judges selected by virtue of a single checkmark.  To the winning 
party, the results are ―fabulous,‖ regardless of how uninformed the 
votes cast.  The most charitable view is that party leaders believe it 
is better to express some view on a candidate rather than none.  A 
less charitable explanation is that straight ticket voting 
consolidates party control in the most durable branch of 
government. 
III.  A SUPREME COURT CHALLENGE TO STRAIGHT TICKET VOTING 
Given these two very different views of straight ticket voting, 
would a constitutional challenge to Texas‘ straight ticket voting 
have any chance of prevailing were it to reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court? 
The starting point for any analysis is the oft-cited leading case on 
state judicial elections, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.52  
The facts of White have often been recited.  The Minnesota judicial 
canons of ethics forbade a judicial candidate from discussing his or 
her ―views on disputed legal and political issues‖ that might come 
before the court to which he or she aspired.53  Finding the canon 
violative of the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment, Justice 
Scalia writing for the Court concluded that particularly in the 
context of an election, state judicial campaign conduct committees 
do not have the power to limit what a judicial candidate may 
―announce‖ with regard to his or her views on matters that may 
come before the court.54  Despite overtures to the importance of 
impartiality, the majority concluded that, pragmatically speaking, it 
would be ludicrous to think that judges do not have pre-formed 
views on the topics that may come before them on the bench.55 
 
52 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
53 Id. at 768. 
54 Id. at 787–88. 
55 Id. at 776–78.  While it did hold that ―announce clauses‖ violated the First Amendment 
rights of judicial candidates, the Court declined to consider the constitutionality of ―promise 
clauses,‖ which forbid a judge from promising to bind himself or herself to a particular 
outcome (effectively pre-judging a case).  Id. at 770. 
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In a concurring opinion, Justice O‘Connor questioned the wisdom 
of contested judicial elections, although she did not go so far as to 
question their constitutionality.  Given the system Minnesota 
employed, speech in these elections was critical, and so she voted 
with the majority.56 
Judicial candidates are therefore free to express their views on 
most any matter, provided they do not pledge to decide one way or 
another once on the bench.57  In practical effect, White has been less 
a boon to the free speech of judicial challengers than a sword 
wielded by interest groups.  Judicial reticence to respond to 
questionnaires from these groups, which often veer perilously close 
to pledges as to how specific cases would be decided, was at one time 
protected by canons like those in Minnesota.  Post-White, the canons 
cannot be used as a shield, and judges are often compelled to 
answer questions they would prefer not to, on peril of losing key 
endorsements. 
If White stands for the proposition that speech by judicial 
candidates has few limits, then the case of New York State Board of 
Elections v. Lopez Torres58 stands for the proposition that insurgent 
candidates can look only to speech to make their case for election; 
they have no constitutional protection in securing a position on the 
ballot in the face of a primary system that enforces political party 
primacy.  This 2008 case was a challenge to the New York 
Democratic Party‘s control of primary elections for the state trial 
court (in New York City victory in the Democratic primary is 
virtually a guarantee of election). 
Under New York‘s partisan election system, political parties 
select a candidate through nominating conventions comprised of 
delegates who have solicited the signatures of 500 party members.59  
While parties that garnered at least 50,000 votes for their candidate 
 
56 O‘Connor wrote: 
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested popular elections instead of 
through an appointment system or a combined appointment and retention election 
system along the lines of the Missouri Plan.  In doing so the State has voluntarily taken 
on the risks to judicial bias described above.  As a result, the State‘s claim that it needs 
to significantly restrict judges‘ speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is 
particularly troubling. If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely 
one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges. 
Id. at 792 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).  Subsequent to her retirement, Justice O‘Connor has 
said that her deciding vote in the 5–4 White decision may be the one vote she regretted 
having made while on the Court. 
57 See id. at 819–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
58 New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008). 
59 Id. at 200. 
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in the most recent gubernatorial election automatically are entitled 
to a spot on the ballot, independent candidates may acquire ballot 
access only if they can solicit 3500–4000 signatures (depending on 
the district in which they are seeking office).60 
Lopez Torres, a Democratic Party insurgent judicial candidate, 
complained that the system made it impossible for her to make the 
inroads needed to garner a nomination.61  Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Justice Scalia affirmed the constitutionality of the New York 
system,62 rejecting the notion that ―one-party entrenchment‖ in a 
given district could violate First Amendment associational rights; 
indeed, the opposite result, he concluded, would violate those same 
rights.63 
In Justice Scalia‘s view, the availability of the petition process, 
which provides a path to the ballot for minority candidates, albeit 
without the blessing of majority party leadership, is enough to 
ameliorate any constitutional concerns.  Concerns about the wisdom 
of the system, he counseled, were best resolved in the legislative 
arena.  As he said in the opinion‘s conclusion: ―New York State has 
thrice . . . displayed a willingness to reconsider its method of 
selecting Supreme Court Justices (the court‘s trial level).  If it 
wishes to return to the primary system that it discarded in 1921, it 
is free to do so; but the First Amendment does not compel that.‖64 
Though the Court‘s unanimous holding was primarily concerned 
with partisan politics in general, the special implications for the 
judicial context were reiterated in a separate concurrence by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy.  In remarks reminiscent of Justice O‘Connor‘s 
concurrence in White,65 he expressed misgivings about the very idea 
of judicial elections.66  However, he could not hold the given 
 
60 Id. at 200–01. 
61 Id. at 197. 
62 Id. at 205–06 (―What constitutes a ‗fair shot‘ is a reasonable enough question for 
legislative judgment . . . . [b]ut it is hardly a manageable constitutional question for judges—
especially for judges in our legal system, where traditional electoral practice gives no hint of 
even the existence, much less the content, of a constitutional requirement for a ‗fair shot‘ at 
party nomination.  Party conventions, with their attendant ‗smoke-filled rooms‘ and 
domination by party leaders, have long been an accepted manner of selecting party 
candidates.‖). 
63 Id. at 208 (―To our knowledge, outside of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment 
contexts . . . no court has ever made ‗one-party entrenchment‘ a basis for interfering with the 
candidate-selection processes of a party.‖) (citations omitted).  The challenges based on other 
amendments have primarily involved racial discrimination.  For a discussion of such cases, 
see California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573 (2000). 
64 Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 209. 
65 White, 536 U.S. at 788–92 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
66 Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―When one considers that 
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circumstances unconstitutional,67 not even in the face of party 
control and manipulation.68  Kennedy did offer his view of how the 
dangerous territory of judicial elections could be successfully 
navigated: 
In light of this longstanding practice and tradition in the 
States [of electing judges], the appropriate practical response 
is not to reject judicial elections outright but to find ways to 
use elections to select judges with the highest qualifications.  
A judicial election system presents the opportunity, indeed 
the civic obligation, for voters and the community as a whole 
to become engaged in the legal process.  Judicial elections, if 
fair and open, could be an essential forum for society to 
discuss and define the attributes of judicial excellence and to 
find ways to discern those qualities in the candidates.69 
If judicial elections are ingrained in certain states‘ political 
traditions, especially partisan elections, then efforts should 
nevertheless be made to produce ―judicial excellence‖ from a 
―societal forum.‖  For under the holding of Lopez Torres, party 
entrenchment at varying levels is perfectly constitutional.70 
Taken together, Lopez Torres and White suggest a system where 
minority party candidates, or insurgent candidates of majority 
parties, must rely on their ability to get their message across to 
voters without the help of a party line endorsement.  They can 
speak; the question is, will anybody hear them? 
The last case we will consider here delineates the outer limit—
that is, where the elected judge system goes so far that it does 
violate constitutional norms.  The most recent Supreme Court case 
involving judicial elections, Caperton v. Massey,71 was a victory 
against the unbridled politicization of judicial elections.  Hugh 
Caperton won a jury verdict of $50 million against the Massey Coal 
Company immediately prior to the 2004 West Virginia judicial 
elections.72 The chairman of Massey subsequently spent 
 
elections require candidates to conduct campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to 
allow for competition among interest groups and political parties, the persisting question is 
whether that process is consistent with the perception and the reality of judicial 
independence and judicial excellence.‖). 
67 Id. at 205–11 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the ability of independent 
candidates who are not party-sponsored to access the ballot through a separate signature 
gathering process saves the constitutionality of the electoral system). 
68 Id. at 212–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
69 Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
70 Id. at 208. 
71 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
72 Id. at 872–73. 
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approximately $3 million on the campaign of Brent Benjamin to 
unseat one of the sitting justices; Benjamin won.73  Caperton sought 
Justice Benjamin‘s recusal from the appeal of his case pursuant to 
the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct, but Benjamin refused 
and was part of the majority that overturned the jury‘s findings.74  
West Virginia state judicial conduct codes, in addition to the 
conference of state chief justices, require recusal whenever a 
―judge‘s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.‖75  Caperton 
again sought recusal of Benjamin for the rehearing; Benjamin 
continued to refuse, even in the face of an opinion poll 
demonstrating that 67% of West Virginians doubted his ability to be 
impartial.76  After the overturning of his jury award was reaffirmed, 
Caperton appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Court, in a 5–4 decision, concluded that ―the probability of 
actual bias [rose] to an unconstitutional level‖ in this instance, 
emphasizing the ―extreme‖ character of the facts and the 
―extraordinary‖ nature of the situation.77 Justice Kennedy‘s 
Caperton majority opinion focused on the plain ills of interested 
parties‘ domination of judicial elections through monetary means. 
Caperton is significant because it demonstrates that there are 
some excesses in the partisan system of judicial elections that are so 
extreme that due process norms are violated.  Yet Lopez Torres 
counsels that even extreme party domination of the ballot is not one 
of them.  Violations, if any, exist only to the extent that a judge 
selected by a system where donation disparities are extreme may be 
incapable of fairness in deciding the case of particular litigants.  So 
long as those extremes are not reached, candidates who have not 
received the accolade of the majority party line for a judicial seat 
have only their White-endorsed right of free speech to make their 
case to the voters.  In all three cases, members of the Court invited 
the respective states to reconsider, in the legislative arena, the 
policy choices they had made in the partisan election of judges. 
Given this trilogy of cases, it appears that a challenge to Texas-
style straight ticket voting would have little chance to prevail before 
the Court.  As in Lopez Torres, minority candidates in Texas can 
certainly appear on the ballot, and there is no impediment to their 
speaking (although little chance they will be noticed).  Nor is the 
 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 873. 
75 Id. at 888–90. 
76 Id. at 874–75. 
77 Id. at 888–90. 
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sort of gross impropriety, or appearance of impropriety, created by 
straight ticket voting alone sufficient to warrant a Caperton finding. 
If New York‘s judicial primary system passes constitutional 
muster, then unfortunately it appears that the ones in Texas, 
Alabama, and West Virginia would too.  But what about that 
invitation by the Court to look at options for reform?  Let‘s look at 
the three states with straight ticket voting, and one more, New 
York, post-Lopez Torres.  Could the Court accomplish by invitation 
what it refused to do by decision? 
A.  Alabama 
In both the 1998 and 2006 cycles, campaign oversight committees 
were established in Alabama, but the state has not shown a 
commitment to long term reform of its partisan system. 
B.  New York 
In 2006, as Lopez Torres was winding its way to the Supreme 
Court,78 Chief Judge of New York Judith Kaye and the four 
presiding justices of the appellate divisions, acting as the 
Administrative Board of the Courts, adopted court rules 
establishing a system of ―Independent Judicial Election 
Qualification Commissions‖ (―IJEQCs‖) for New York State.  The 
IJEQCs in each state judicial district represented a nonpartisan 
statewide screening process to review the experience and 
qualifications of candidates for the courts of general jurisdiction in 
New York.  The IJEQCs were one of the most important 
recommendations of the Feerick Commission, a panel appointed by 
Chief Judge Kaye to study the New York judicial election system 
and recommend measures to promote public confidence in the 
judicial election system.79 
The IJEQCs have been used in New York since 2007.  The 
Commissions are designed to be independent of political influence 
and include both lawyers and non-lawyers.80  The IJEQC is the 
most significant reform in the New York judicial selection system 
since the court moved to a merit selection system for its Court of 
 
78 Lopez Torres v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 411 F.Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
79 See COMMISSION TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2006), 
http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/FerrickJudicialElection.pdf 
80 See Judicial Campaign Ethics Center, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/jcec/index.shtml (last visited June. 3, 2012). 
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Appeals judges (the state‘s highest court) in 1977.  Preliminary 
assessments from court administrators in New York have been very 
positive.81 
C.  Texas 
The height of the judicial reform movement in Texas was 
unrelated to straight-ticket voting, but was related to the amount of 
money going into state appellate and supreme court races.  In 1980, 
Texas became the first state in which the cost of a judicial race 
exceeded $1 million.  Between 1980 and 1986, campaign 
contributions to candidates in contested appellate court races 
increased by two hundred fifty percent.  The 1988 supreme court 
elections were the most expensive in Texas history, with twelve 
candidates for six seats raising $12 million.  Between 1992 and 
1997, the seven winning candidates for the Texas Supreme Court 
raised nearly $9.2 million dollars. Of this $9.2 million, more than 
fourty was contributed by parties or lawyers with cases before the 
court or by contributors linked to those parties. 
To address the perceived impropriety of judges soliciting and 
accepting large campaign contributions from attorneys and parties 
who appear before them, the Texas legislature passed the Judicial 
Campaign Fairness Act in 1995, and it was signed by then-Governor 
Bush. 
Texas has never adopted a judicial performance evaluation 
system or any form of judicial screening program. 
D.  West Virginia 
In reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court‘s holding in Caperton, then 
Governor Joe Manchin designated an independent commission on 
judicial reform, which released recommendations on November 15, 
2009.  The leading recommendations were for the state to adopt a 
public financing pilot program for one of the two open supreme 
court of appeals seats in the 2012 elections, and that has been 
 
81 In particular, directors of the commissions in the Upstate regions have found 
participation to be very high, roughly around 80%.  And at least in the Albany region, it has 
become common practice for a potential candidate to go through the qualification process 
before seeking a party‘s nomination.  Telephone Interview with Timothy O‘Keefe, Director, 
Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commissions, Third Department (Dec. 28, 2011). 
This suggests that the parties, regardless of how influential and powerful, are at least 
embracing a criterion of legitimacy. 
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done.82  Additional recommendations were codification of an 
advisory commission procedure for selection of state supreme court 
judges, for establishing an intermediate appellate court, and for 
creating a business court.  No recommendations were made 
regarding the partisan election system in West Virginia, and none 
on ballot format. 
IV.  GOING FORWARD 
It appears that the states invited by the Court to consider reform 
in the decisions in Lopez-Torres and Caperton—New York and West 
Virginia—have approached the task with varying degrees of 
success.  Nor have the straight ticket voting states considered 
above—Texas, Alabama, and West Virginia—taken a cue from the 
Court‘s decisions to re-examine the pernicious effects of partisan 
elections on the independence and accountability of their own 
courts.  Is there no balm in Gilead?  Chief Justice Jefferson noted, 
―[s]o long as we cast straight ticket ballots for judges, the fate of all 
judges is controlled by the whim of the political tide.‖83  Though the 
most partisan individuals may disagree, that relationship cannot be 
consistent with basic notions of judicial fairness and integrity.  
Straight ticket voting may be a bad idea for politics generally, but it 
is especially inadequate and unfit for the election of judges.  We will 
conclude by considering next steps in the battle for reform. 
A.  The Potential of Legislative Reform 
The most likely source of reform is the state legislatures 
themselves.  While straight ticket voting was at one time 
widespread, efforts to scale back the availability of straight ticket 
voting have been successful in a number of states.  Illinois, for 
instance, which also elects its judges, legislatively removed the 
straight ticket option from its ballots in 1997.84  Chicago was at one 
point the definition of a party machine city, a city entirely beholden 
to Democrats who rejected attempts at good government reform; it 
was also a city that could include up to seventy-two judges on its 
 
82 Billy Corriher, West Virginia Rolls Out Public Financing for Judges, HARVARD L & POL‘Y 
REV. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012), http://hlpronline.com/2012/04/west-virginia-rolls-out-public-
financing-for-judges/.  
83 Jefferson, supra note 29, at 289. 
84 Dirk Johnson, The 1998 Campaign: The Voting Booth; Straight-Ticket Voting Losing 
Ease in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/29/us/1998-
campaign-voting-booth-straight-ticket-voting-losing-ease-illinois.html. 
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ballots for retention elections.85  While Chicago may remain a 
largely Democratic stronghold, at the very least, the party has now 
lost the ease of instructing voters to simply pull a single lever; as a 
consequence, every name on the ballot must be confronted.   
Convincing political parties to relinquish a mechanism that not 
only guarantees a particularized set of votes but also an easy and 
powerful method of campaigning is difficult, to say the least.  
Illinois struck straight ticket voting when the Republicans had 
control of the state‘s legislative assembly; the GOP uniformly 
approved of the move and Democrats uniformly opposed.86  In 
actuality, the Republicans did so as a dying gasp: They had just lost 
control of the state house and passed the bill during a lame duck 
session.87  The Democratic resistance was fierce; the battle made its 
way through the Illinois court system, under the title Orr v. 
Edgar.88  The Orr court refused to accept any of the plaintiff‘s 
arguments, which ranged from the limitation of voter choice to the 
particularized burden on the elderly (who would have to wait longer 
and navigate more of a ballot).89  The measure stood and Illinois no 
longer has the straight ticket option.90 
Good government efforts across the country have similarly 
targeted straight ticket voting in states where judges are not 
elected.91  As to the states where elected judges are most impacted 
by straight ticket voting, some legislative movement is underway in 
Texas.92  A state senator is preparing to file a bill that would 
eliminate the straight ticket option; he concludes that the option 
 
85 Id. 
86 David C. Kimball & Chris T. Owens, Where‘s the Party? Eliminating One-Punch Voting, 
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 1 (Apr. 29, 
2000), available at http://www.umsl.edu/~kimballd/mpsa00.doc. 
87 Rick Pearson, Court Delivers Ko to One-Punch Voting, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 7, 1998), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-10-07/news/9810070075_1_women-voters-illinois-
supreme-court-straight-ticket-voting. 
88 Orr v. Edgar, 698 N.E.2d 560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
89 See id. at 564–66. 
90 See id. at 566. 
91 See, e.g., Jo Mannies, Clay Endorses Prop P, Reminds Dems No More Straight-Ticket 
Voting, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-
and-politics/political-fix/article_7780f018-ca53-5078-8a44-b2696aa45e51.html. Missouri, 
which employs merit selection of its judges (also known as the Missouri Plan), ended the 
availability of straight ticket voting in 2006.  See Josh Goodman, Voting the Straight-Ticket 
Sweep, GOVERNING: THE STATES AND LOCALITIES (June 2010), http://www.governing.com 
/topics/politics/Voting-the-Straight-Ticket-Sweep.html; Judicial Selection in the States: 
Missouri, AM. JUDICATURE SOC‘Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/i 
ndex.cfm?state=MO (last visited June 3, 2012). 
92 See Aman Batheja, Straight Ticket Votes Reach 10-Year High in Texas’ Largest Counties, 
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 9, 2010. 
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―encourages less thoughtful voting.‖93  Unfortunately, the same 
senator has filed similar bills in the past to no avail.94  Both parties 
have expressed extreme resistance to the idea and consider the 
proposition a proposed limitation on voter choice.95  While perhaps 
the option to spend minimal to no time in the ballot booth, not a 
second of which is truly deliberative, would be removed, it would, in 
fact, be for the betterment of democracy and the judiciary.  The 
parties, unsurprisingly, fear any limitation on their power, and the 
removal of the straight ticket option would be just such a limitation. 
One opponent to the reform views voting as such: ―[p]eople are 
buying a preference of a brand, and Americans have been trained to 
do that in their consumerism, and there‘s no reason to say they 
can‘t do that in their politics.‖96  On the contrary, the marketing of 
judges as mere accessories to the whole of a political party is simply 
bad for justice. 
B.  Making Party Identification Work for Judicial Integrity 
How can states like Alabama, Texas, and West Virginia be 
successful as Illinois was?  In Texas, straight ticket voting ensures 
Democratic domination in urban centers, and Republican rule on 
the state level.  In New York, upstate elections perpetuate 
Republican control of judicial seats, and downstate elections 
perpetuate Democratic control.  Both parties have reasons to favor 
keeping a practice that assures particularized and predictable 
strongholds, reasons that likely ring stronger in the non-judicial 
context.  Consequently, reform will likely need to be predicated on 
politics proper: legislative and executive elections.  The Republicans 
in Illinois achieved statewide control with the aid of straight ticket 
voting (outside of Chicago).97  But, they lost that control as well 
through the same mechanism.98  Illinois Republican leadership 
conceded that the move may hamper them along with the 
 
93 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94 Id. 
95 See Texas Bill Would Outlaw Straight-Ticket Voting, KTRK (HOUS. ABC AFFILIATE), 
Dec. 13, 2010, available at http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/politics&id 
=7840828.  A Texas Republican Party spokesperson countered that they were ―in favor of 
giving voters an option, not taking options from voters,‖ while a Democratic Party 
spokesperson said ―[i]t‘s critical‖ that the option be preserved as voters ―take pride in voting 
the Democratic ticket.‖  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
96 Batheja, supra note 92 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97 See Kimball & Owens, supra note 86, at 3. 
98 See id. 
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Democrats,99 but vowed to rely on the strength of their ―stronger 
message‖ and ―better candidates.‖100  Was this a mere ―slap‖ at the 
Democrats who had just bested them,101 or were the Republicans 
serious about a turn to relying on hard work on the campaign trail 
instead of ease at the ballot box? 
In reality, do parties even have an identifiable ―brand,‖ one 
valuable to voters or consumers, when the campaign message is 
reduced to ―one and you‘re done?‖ Arguments about limiting voter 
choice demean the ability and political interest of the voters 
themselves; the argument in favor of so-called ―choice‖ is really that 
the straight ticket option allows the party machinery to capitalize 
on voter inattention. 
If the straight ticket option were eliminated, Texas Republicans 
would undoubtedly still wield control at the state level and Texas 
Democrats would still, barring a nationwide shift in the political 
mood (as was the case in 2010), generally maintain their success in 
the cities.  Strongholds would remain strongholds, whether in 
Alabama or West Virginia. 
An intriguing observation on this point was made by former 
United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor, who 
since retiring from the high Court has spoken frequently on the 
methods used to select state judges.  As an Arizona state legislator, 
Justice O‘Connor had been involved in the original legislation 
establishing merit selection in her home state.  ―We didn‘t try to do 
it in the rural districts,‖ she has observed, because the legislators in 
those districts would have voted against the proposal for urban 
districts.102  To this day, only counties with populations greater 
than 250,000 employ the merit selection system in Arizona.103  In 
the smaller (primarily rural) counties, judges are still elected in 
non-partisan elections.104 
 
99 While Democrats undoubtedly benefitted from straight ticket voting in Cook County 
(Chicago), Republicans uniformly benefitted from the practice in ―the collar‖ (the counties 
surrounding Cook County on Lake Michigan), not to mention more rural areas of the state, 
and had ridden the practice to state legislative victories in the past.  See Pearson, supra note 
85; see also Kimball & Owens, supra note 84, at 2. 
100 See Pearson, supra note 85. 
101 Id. 
102 E-mail from Linda H. Neary, Secretary to Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor (Ret.), to Meryl 
Chertoff, Director, The Justice and Society Program, The Aspen Institute, and Adjunct 
Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 5, 2012, 9:55 EST) (on file with 
author) (confirming Justice O‘Connor‘s consent to release the quote). 
103 Mark I. Harrison et al., On the Validity and Vitality of Arizona’s Judicial Merit 
Selection System: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 245 (2007). 
104 See Judicial Selection in the States: Arizona, AM. JUDICATURE SOC‘Y, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=AZ (last visited June 3, 
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O‘Connor‘s point underscores the need for reformers to be flexible 
and to consider piecemeal reform efforts.  If Texas is unwilling to 
depart from a straight-ticket system in statewide elections, then 
perhaps the departure can be made in urban districts where the 
ballots are already longer and more unwieldy. 
Success may actually be more likely during Republican-controlled 
legislative sessions; traditionally Democratic demographics are the 
ones more likely to suffer a slight increase in roll-off following the 
elimination of straight ticket voting.105  While there may be some 
increase in ticket splitting,106 a party will acquire greater and 
lasting strength through the clear articulation of its positions, 
rather than by unthinking affiliative behavior.  Given the threat to 
judicial independence that party domination may facilitate, 
removing the straight ticket option is a fairly simple, but highly 
symbolic step toward making judicial elections more transparent. 
Since legislatures have often proved to be the stumbling block for 
reform efforts, we have one final modest suggestion for Texas and 
other straight ticket voting states like Alabama and West Virginia.  
Their judicial leaders might want to take a look at the IJEQC 
system that has been used in New York State, another partisan 
election state, since 2007.  The elegance of the IJEQC is that it did 
not, at least in New York, require legislative approval, but was 
established by the judicial branch itself.  The political parties can 
accept the recommendation of IJEQCs, or they can reject them, but 
a rejection certainly provides insurgents and minority party 
candidates with a fine talking point for their campaigns.  Given 
Chief Justice Jefferson‘s firmly articulated support of reform of the 
judicial selection process in Texas,107 and particularly his 
statements opposing straight-ticket voting, an IJEQC that uses 
New York‘s innovations as a template could be a valuable adjunct to 
efforts to ‗reform from within‘ the Texas bench—at least until 
something better comes along. 
 
2012). 
105 Kimball & Owens, supra note 84, at 13.  Their study of Illinois elections post-removal of 
the option concluded that Republican demographics already are less inclined to roll-off than 
Democratic ones.  See id.  Additionally, though applied to a midterm year, they determined 
that elimination of the ―one punch‖ option did not substantially increase roll-off overall.  See 
id. 
106 Id. 
107 See generally Jefferson, supra note 5 (explaining that merit matters little in straight-
ticket judicial elections). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the key to finding something better than straight 
ticket voting in judicial elections in the states that now allow it will 
be a successful lobbying effort, coupled with public education, to 
create a true momentum for change.  In the meanwhile, piecemeal 
reform, and judge-created reform, may ameliorate some of the worst 
effects of straight-ticket voting.  The greatest evil, however, would 
be continued indifference to the straight ticket.  At best, the practice 
is an abuse of intelligent democracy.  At worst, straight ticket 
voting corrupts the integrity of a judicial selection system, impairs 
judicial independence, and makes the accountability of judges flow 
not to the voters, but to party bosses. 
 
